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Michael P. Scharf* 
 
Professor Michael Lawrence:  
 
It’s a real pleasure to welcome our Keynote Speaker, Professor Michael 
Scharf.  Professor Scharf is the John Deaver Drinko–Baker and Hofstetler 
Professor of Law and Director of the Frederick K. Cox International Law 
Center at Case Western Reserve University School of Law.  
In 2004 and 2005, Professor Scharf served as a member of the 
international team of experts that provided training to the Judges of the Iraqi 
High Tribunal.  In 2006, he led the first training session for the Investigative 
Judges and Prosecutors of the newly established, UN–backed Cambodian 
Genocide Tribunal,1 and in November 2008 he served as Special Assistant 
to the Prosecutor of the Cambodia Tribunal.  He is currently co–leader of a 
USAID–funded project to assist the government of Uganda in establishing a 
special war crimes trials and truth commission.  In February 2005, Professor 
Scharf and the Public International Law and Policy Group—an NGO he co–
founded—were nominated for the Nobel Peace Prize for the work they have 
done to help in the prosecution of major war criminals, such as Slobodan 
Milosevic, Charles Taylor, and Sadaam Hussein.  During the elder Bush and 
Clinton Administrations, Professor Scharf served in the Office of the Legal 
Advisor of the U.S. Department of State where he held the positions of 
Attorney–Advisor for Law Enforcement and Intelligence, Attorney–Advisor 
for UN Affairs, and Delegate to the UN Human Rights Commission.  
A graduate of Duke University School of Law, where he graduated with 
high honors and Order of the Coif, he was Judicial Clerk on the 11th Circuit 
Federal Court of Appeals and is the author of over seventy scholarly articles 
and thirteen books, including three that have won National Book of the Year 
awards.  His latest book is Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis, 
published by Cambridge University Press in 2010.  Professor Scharf has 
also testified before the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the 
House Armed Services Committee and appears frequently in the national 
and international media. 
  
 * This address by Michael P. Scharf was presented at the MSU Journal of 
International Law Symposium titled, “Is There a War on Terror? Torture, Rendition, 
Guantanamo, and Obama’s Preventive Detention” at Michigan State University College of 
Law in February 2010.  
 1. The official name of the Court is the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of 
Cambodia for the Prosecution of Crimes Committed during the Period of Democratic 
Kampuchea. It was established by the Cambodian National Assembly in 2001. Introduction: 
Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia, 
http://www.eccc.gov.kh/english/about_eccc.aspx (last visited Oct. 28, 2010). 
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It’s a great honor, as I said, to have Professor Scharf with us here this 
evening.  We really appreciate [him] coming.  Please join me in welcoming 
Professor Scharf. 
 
Professor Michael Scharf:  
 
Thank you so much, Professor Lawrence, for that kind welcome.  The 
topic I’m going to be speaking about today is related to my new book, 
Shaping Foreign Policy in Times of Crisis.2 Based on qualitative empirical 
data, the book examines whether government legal advisers and policy–
makers have perceived international law as real law, and whether they have 
ever passed up their foreign policy preferences so as not to violate 
international law. 
The book includes a chapter called Lawyering the War on Terror, which 
I want to focus my remarks on this evening.  The chapter tells the 
extraordinary story of how, in the months following the attacks of 9/11, the 
legal policy of the U.S. government with respect to the War on Terror was 
hijacked and dictated by a cabal of four government lawyers who called 
themselves the “War Council.” They could just as easily have been called 
the “Torture Team,” or “T-Team” for short because together, this team of 
highly–placed government lawyers produced a series of legal memoranda—
which deliberately ignored adverse precedent, misrepresented legal 
authority, and were written to support a pre–ordained result.3 
The ominous presence behind the group was Vice President Dick 
Cheney, who sought to unshackle the President from the restraints posed by 
the Geneva Conventions,4 the UN Convention against Torture,5 and the 
federal laws that implement those treaties.  In his words, “[w]hen you 
contemplate the 9/11 [attack] with terrorists instead of being armed with 
box cutters and airline tickets, equipped with a nuclear weapon or a 
biological agent of some kind in the middle of one of our cities and think 
  
 2. MICHAEL P. SCHARF & PAUL R. WILLIAMS, SHAPING FOREIGN POLICY IN TIMES OF 
CRISIS: THE ROLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT LEGAL ADVISER 
(2010). 
 3. Office of Prof’l Responsibility, U.S. Dept. of Justice, Report of Investigation into 
the Office of Legal Counsel’s Memorandum Concerning Issues into the Cent. Intelligence 
Agency’s Use of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists 160 (2009) 
[hereinafter Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report], available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/OPRFinalReport090729.pdf. See also id. at 3, 9, 51-
52, 159, 226, 227, 228.    
 4. The Geneva Conventions of 1949, 
http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/genevaconventions (last visited Oct. 28, 
2010). 
 5. United Nations Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or 
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 12, 1984, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85. 
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about the consequences of that and then I think we’re justified in taking 
bold action.”6 
The self–anointed “War Council” was led by Vice President Cheney’s 
Chief Counsel and trusted lieutenant, David Addington—about whom it 
was said, “if you favored international law, you were in danger of being 
called ‘soft on terrorism.’”7 The second dominant figure was Jim Haynes, 
the Chief Counsel of the Department of Defense—a political appointee who 
had served as Best Man at Addington’s wedding.8 The third figure in this 
group was White House Chief Counsel Alberto Gonzales—a life–long 
friend of the President George W. Bush who famously declared after the 
2001 U.S. invasion of Afghanistan that the Geneva Conventions were 
“quaint” and “outmoded” and did not apply to this new War on Terror.9 
But the most important member of all turned out to be a young Berkeley 
Law Professor named John Yoo, a hired gun placed as Deputy Head of the 
Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), a government of-
fice with extraordinary power to issue memos interpreting the government’s 
requirements under the United States Constitution and federal statutes.  Yoo 
had come to the White House’s attention because he had authored a series 
of law review articles arguing for near limitless powers of the Presidency 
during crisis.10 He was a true believer and a prolific writer—and it was his 
work product that would in a few years garner the mantle “White House 
Torture Memos.”11 
My book recounts the story about how these four individuals intention-
ally cut off the government’s primary experts on the Geneva Conventions, 
the Torture Convention, and customary international law from the decision–
making process, and thereby presented a one–sided and distorted view of 
U.S. obligations under international law that led to a widespread govern-
ment policy and practice of torture.  According to a bi–partisan December 
2008 Senate Armed Services Committee Report, “[t]hose OLC opinions 
distorted the meaning and intent of anti–torture laws, rationalized the abuse 
of detainees in U.S. custody and influenced Department of Defense deter-
minations as to what interrogation techniques were legal for use during in-
terrogations conducted by U.S. military personnel.”12 
  
 6. Interview by Jonathan Karl with Dick Cheney, Vice President of the United 
States, in Wash., D.C. (Dec. 15, 2008), available at 
http://abcnews.go.com/print?id=6464697. 
 7. PHILIPPE SANDS, TORTURE TEAM 213 (2008). 
 8. Id. 
 9. Memorandum from Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to President George W. Bush, 
(Jan. 25, 2002), reprinted in 37 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 615 app. (2006). 
 10. Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report, supra note 2, at 26, 122.   
 11. Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report, supra note 2, at 227 (“According to [CIA 
Director] Rizzo, there was never any doubt that waterboarding would be approved by Yoo, 
and the client clearly regarded OLC as willing to find a way to achieve the desired result.”). 
 12. S. Armed Services Comm., 110th Cong., Inquiry into the Treatment of Detainees 
in U.S. Custody, xxvii (2008) [hereinafter Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry]. 
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How did they get away with it?  To accomplish their goal, first the “War 
Council” sought to convince the President and other officials that 
international law was not real law.  They discredited efforts to use law or 
legal institutions to challenge U.S. detention and interrogation policies by 
labeling it “lawfare.” Next, they took actions calculated to cut the State 
Department Legal Adviser out of the “clearance process” concerning 
treatment of detainees. 
The State Department Legal Adviser has long been known as 
“[America’s] conscience on international law.”13 Unlike the lawyers 
involved in the “War Council,” the State Department Legal Adviser must be 
confirmed by the Senate, which ensures that persons with radical 
conceptions of the law will not be appointed to the post.  The Legal 
Adviser’s opinion draws on the expertise of 170 international legal experts 
in the office, many of whom have been in the government for many years.  
Therefore, they not only have greater expertise in international law than 
attorneys in OLC or the White House, but also have more interactions with 
foreign counterparts and more experience regarding the consequences of 
violating international law on American foreign policy. 
In his 2006 memoir of his days at OLC, John Yoo writes: “The State De-
partment and OLC often disagreed about international law.  State believed 
that international law had a binding effect on the President, indeed on the 
United States, both internationally and domestically;” whereas Yoo and the 
other members of the “War Council” did not hold to that view.14  William 
Taft, who was the State Department Legal Adviser at the time, observed 
that his office was likely excluded from the decision–making process due to 
the fear that “in light of some of the positions we had taken, that we would 
not agree with some of the conclusions other lawyers in the Bush Admini-
stration expected to reach and that we might ‘leak’ information about the 
work to the press.”15 The “War Council” even used heightened categories of 
classification in order to keep the State Department Legal Adviser out of the 
loop.16  In other words, they classified the draft torture memos as “need to 
know” and then maintained that the Legal Adviser did not actually have 
such a need. 
From this case study, one might speculate that over the years State 
Department Legal Advisers have often been cut out of the clearance process 
by policy–makers who view international law as an obstacle to attaining 
national security goals.  To test that supposition, my Shaping Foreign 
Policy in Times of Crisis co–author, Paul Williams, and I assembled the ten 
living former Legal Advisers—going all the way back to the Carter 
  
 13. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at xv. 
 14. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON 
TERROR 33 (2006). 
 15. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 130. 
 16. Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report, supra note 3, at 260, 122. 
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Administration—for a day–long discussion at the Carnegie Endowment.  
We asked them each to tell us about the role of international law during the 
crises that unfolded during their tenure in the Office. 
Somewhat surprisingly, the Legal Advisers provided numerous examples 
of times they counseled the President against a proposed action which the 
Legal Adviser opined would violate international law.  Sometimes the 
position of the Legal Adviser did not carry the day, but usually, they said, 
the President backed down.  Often this led to the adoption of third options 
that did not contravene international law.  As Michael Matheson, who spent 
thirty years in the State Department’s Office of the Legal Advisor (several 
as Acting Legal Adviser), summed up: “So there really is a spectrum in 
which perhaps only on the extreme end of the spectrum does international 
law always win the day, but even on other parts of the spectrum, 
international law is a definite constraint on policymakers.”17   
Sadly, the Legal Advisers also shared stories of a handful of other 
times—like the case of the torture memos—where the Legal Advisor was 
intentionally cut out of the process.  It didn’t happen often—in fact, they 
related only four occasions during the past thirty years.  The Legal Advisers 
mentioned the following cases in which they were purposely cut out of the 
decision making process: the 1980s mining of Nicaraguan harbors and 
armed support for the Contras, the 1990 kidnapping of Dr. Alvarez–
Machain from Mexico, and—as described above—the adoption of policies 
related to treatment of detainees in the aftermath of 9/11.18 
Interestingly, in each such case, the same policy–makers that cut the 
State Department Legal Adviser out of the decision–making process ended 
up seeking the Legal Adviser’s assistance in crafting after–the–fact legal 
justifications for the decisions and actions taken.  As Stephen Schwebel, a 
former Deputy Legal Adviser who later served as President of the 
International Court of Justice, once remarked: “[t]he [Legal Adviser] is 
always called in to pick up the pieces even if he was not influentially 
involved in the initial decision.”19  Thus, in relation to the mining of 
Nicaragua’s harbors, former Legal Adviser Davis Robinson said:  
“As it turned out, all that the lawyers could contribute was assistance in 
after–the–fact containment of a train wreck.  I remember one Secretary of 
State under whom I served stating, ‘I have only one rigid rule and that is, 
don’t ever let me be blindsided.’ I can only have wished that this sensible 
rule had applied to L [the Office of the Legal Adviser] as well.”20   
 
  
 17. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 155. 
 18. Id. at 211-12. 
 19. Stephen M. Schwebel, Remarks on the Role of the Legal Advisor of the U.S. State 
Department, 2 EUR. J. INT’L L. 132, 134 (1991). 
 20. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 212. 
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For a comparative perspective on this problem, we turned to former UK 
Foreign Ministry Legal Adviser Sir Frank Berman.  He told us that “the 
most notorious incident where the UK Legal Adviser was deliberately cut 
out of the loop was the 1956 Suez invasion.”21 Berman said, however, that 
the UK government had learned from that mishap and had adopted policies 
to ensure against a repeat.  In his words: 
“[i]t is [now] considered a cardinal sin within the UK Foreign Office to put 
up a policy submission that did not clearly recite that the Legal Adviser or 
his staff had been consulted, or which did not include an analysis of the 
legal questions which were relevant to the decision.  If the submission did 
not contain this, then any legitimate senior official or minister would send 
it back for a complete analysis to know what the law stated.”22 
 
The United States would do well to adopt a similar internal rule requiring 
the State Department Legal Adviser’s input on policy matters involving 
international law.  As Davis Robinson summed up:  
“The main lesson that I drew from my days [as Legal Adviser] is that, if 
the U.S. Government is to realize the full benefit of the potential 
contribution of its international lawyers, the lawyers need to participate 
from the beginning of a take–off in policy and not just in a crash landing 
whenever things go wrong.”23  
 
Now let me turn to the big picture.  As I mentioned earlier, one of the 
aims of the “War Council” was to convince policy–makers that international 
law is not real law.  That quest was later taken to a larger audience by 
Professor Jack Goldsmith of Harvard Law School.  In his 2007 memoir, The 
Terror Presidency, Goldsmith identifies himself as “part of a group of 
conservative intellectuals—dubbed ‘new sovereigntists’ in Foreign Affairs 
magazine—who were skeptical about the creeping influence of international 
law on American law.”24  Together with Professor Eric Posner of University 
of Chicago Law School, in 2005 Goldsmith wrote The Limits of 
International Law,25 a potentially revolutionary work26 that employs rational 
  
 21. Id. 
 22. Id.  
 23. SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 213. 
 24. JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE 
BUSH ADMINISTRATION 21 (2007). (“My academic objections to this trend were based on the 
need for democratic control over the norms that governed American conduct.  My 
scholarship argued against the judicial activism that gave birth to international human rights 
lawsuits in U.S. courts.  It decried developments in ‘customary international law’ that 
purported to bind the United States to international rules to which the nation’s political 
leaders had not consented.”). 
 25. JACK L. GOLDSMITH & ERIC A. POSNER, THE LIMITS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
(2005). 
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choice theory to argue that international law is really just “politics” and that 
it is no more unlawful to contravene a treaty or a rule of customary 
international law than it would be to disregard a non–binding letter of 
intent.27 Goldsmith and Posner conclude that States have no preference for 
compliance with international law, they are unaffected by the “legitimacy” 
of a rule of law, past consent to a rule does not generate compliance, and 
decision–makers do not internalize a norm of compliance with international 
law.  According to Goldsmith and Posner, States employ international law 
when it is convenient, are free to ignore it when it is not, and have every 
right to place their sovereign interests first—indeed, democratic States have 
an obligation to do so when international law threatens to undermine 
federalism, separation of powers, and domestic sovereignty.28  
While serving as Special Counsel to Secretary of Defense Donald 
Rumsfeld, and later as Assistant Attorney General in charge of the Office of 
Legal Counsel in the Bush Administration, Goldsmith saw it as his mission 
to convince those inside the government that international rules that 
constrain U.S. power—and thus compromise national security—are not 
really binding.  A 2003 inter–agency memo prepared by Goldsmith, titled 
“The Judicialization of International Politics,” warns:  “In the past quarter 
century, various nations, NGOs, academics, international organizations, and 
others in the ‘international community’ have been busily weaving a web of 
international laws and judicial institutions that today threatens US 
Government interests.”  The memo continues:  
“The US Government has seriously underestimated this threat, and has 
mistakenly assumed that confronting the threat will worsen it.  Unless we 
tackle the problem head–on, it will continue to grow. The issue is 
especially urgent because of the unusual challenges we face in the war on 
terrorism.”29  
The Limits of International Law can be understood as Goldsmith’s effort 
to bring this “anti–lawfare” argument to a wider audience. 
  
 26. George Washington University Law Professor Edward Swaine writes that U.S. 
elites may seize on Goldsmith/Posner’s book to justify noncompliance with international law 
and may have done so already.  Edward Swaine, Restoring and (Risking) Interest in 
International Law, 100 AM. J. INT’L L. 259 (2006). University of Maryland Law Professor 
David Gray has opined that Goldsmith/Posner’s views “are sure to become standard currency 
in international law theory and practice.” David Gray, Rule-Skepticism, ‘Strategery,’ and the 
Limits of International Law, 46 VA. J. INT’L L. 563, 583 (2006). 
 27. GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 23, at 90; See also Eric Posner, Do States 
Have a Moral Obligation to Obey International Law? 55 STAN. L. REV. 1901, 1901 (2003). 
 28. Goldsmith and Posner are particularly concerned about international law’s 
propensity to shift decisional authority from local government and the federal executive to 
international institutions and activist federal judges. See GOLDSMITH & POSNER, supra note 
25. 
 29. GOLDSMITH, supra note 24, at 60. 
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As Professor Allen Buchanan of Duke University has pointed out, 
Goldsmith and Posner’s “normative claims, if valid, would lend support to 
the view that it is wholly permissible for the U.S. government to take a 
purely instrumental stance toward international law, and that its citizens do 
not have a moral obligation to try to prevent their government from doing 
so.”30  Similarly, Professor Oona Hathaway of Yale Law School has 
concluded that there is a necessary connection between Goldsmith and 
Posner’s underlying “revisionist” political agenda and their book’s 
methodological approach and conclusions.31 And as Professor Margaret 
McGuinness of University of Missouri–Columbia observes: “The book 
cannot be viewed as separate from the authors’ broader normative project—
a project that seeks to minimize U.S. participation in international 
institutions and to limit the application of international law in the United 
States by expanding presidential power and limiting the role of the 
judiciary.”32  Finally, Professor Mary Ellen O’Connell of Notre Dame 
warns, “[a] policymaker reading the book might well conclude that 
compliance with international law, such as the 1949 Geneva Conventions or 
the Convention against Torture, is optional….”33   
Goldsmith and Posner draw their conclusions by examining government 
decision–making from outside an opaque box.  According to Professor 
Andrew T. Guzman of California–Berkley’s Boalt Hall School of Law, 
Goldsmith and Posner rely on a selective use of a handful of case studies 
which are no more than anecdotal in nature, and their identification of the 
controlling state interests in each is almost entirely conjectural.34 Professor 
David Golove of New York University observes that “Goldsmith and 
Posner make little effort to investigate direct historical evidence … of the 
actual motivations of the individuals who made the decisions on which they 
focus.  Instead, they focus … on the events themselves and draw speculative 
inferences about why States acted as they did.”35 By employing the 
qualitative empirical data obtained from the day–long conference of State 
  
 30. Allen Buchanan, Democracy and the Commitment to International Law, 34 GA. 
J. INT’L & COMP. L. 306, 307-08 (2006). 
 31. Oona A. Hathaway & Ariel N. Lavinbuk, Rationalism and Revisionism in 
International Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1404, 1404 (2006). 
 32. Margaret E. McGuinness, Exploring the Limits of International Human Rights 
Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 393, 421 (2006). 
 33. MARY ELLEN O’CONNELL, THE POWER AND PURPOSE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 
104 (2009). 
 34. Andrew T. Guzman, The Promise of International Law, 92 VA. L. REV. 533, 540 
(2006) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner misrepresent the facts in their international trade 
case study); David M. Golove, Leaving Customary International Law Where it is: Goldsmith 
and Posner’s The Limits of International Law, 34 GA. J. INT’L  COMP. L. 333, 355-57 
(2006) (arguing that Goldsmith and Posner’s account is “cherry–picked and fails to present a 
fair picture of the ‘Free Ships, Free Goods’” example).  
 35. Golove, supra note 34, at 348. 
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Department Legal Advisers, my book seeks to fill the void, enabling the 
reader to discern which side of the debate better reflects reality. 
Goldsmith and Posner assert that the decision–makers do not perceive a 
moral commitment to comply with international law in the same way they 
do domestic law.  The findings set forth in my book indicate that this might 
in fact be true.  The Legal Advisers really weren’t the type that would put 
much stock on the so–called “moral authority” of the law.  They were a 
practical bunch, perhaps leaning toward the “realist” school.  But at the 
same time, they would likely ascribe to Luis Henkin’s observation that 
“realists who do not recognize the uses and the force of law are not 
realistic.” 36 Thus, while not based on so–called “moral pull,” it turned out 
that the Legal Advisers nonetheless felt a strong sense of obligation to 
comply with international law based on concerns about reputation as a law–
abiding State, long–term self–interest in the maintenance of order, and/or 
long–term self–interest in a functioning legal system. 
The Legal Advisers all recognized (and advised policy makers) that 
violations can engender international condemnation, strain relations with 
allies, and interfere with the ability of the United States to obtain 
international support for important policy initiatives—in particular in 
fighting international terrorism, suppressing narcotics trafficking, 
controlling weapons of mass destruction, and achieving fair and free trade.  
Moreover, the Legal Advisers recognized that when a State elects to ignore 
or reinterpret an existing international rule according to its own short term 
interests, it runs the risk of being unable to invoke the rule in the future, to 
its ultimate detriment. 
Let me say a few words about reputation, which Goldsmith and Posner 
dismiss as undeserving of serious consideration.  It turns out that America’s 
controversial policies concerning treatment of detainees began to affect U.S. 
diplomatic power over a broad spectrum of issues, including gaining foreign 
support for efforts in the War on Terror, the war against drugs, the war 
against corruption, and global warming.  It made it hard for America’s 
negotiators—in a host of foreign and international forums—to do their job.  
The bi–partisan Commission that investigated the September 11th attacks 
concluded in a 2005 report that “[t]he U.S. policy on treating detainees is 
undermining the war on terrorism by tarnishing America’s reputation as a 
moral leader.”37 The bi–partisan 2008 Senate Committee Report similarly 
observed: “The impact of those abuses has been significant.”38 Citing polls 
indicating that Abu Ghraib and Guantanamo Bay have generated negative 
  
 36. See SCHARF & WILLIAMS, supra note 2, at 214 (the author argues here, as he did 
in his cited work, that Luis Henkin’s observation may be appropriately applied to 
international law). 
 37. Barbara Slavin, Abuse of Detainees Undercuts U.S. Authority, 9/11 Panel Says, 
USA TODAY, Nov. 15, 2005, at 8A.  
 38. Senate Armed Services Committee Inquiry, supra note 12, at xxv. 
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perceptions of the United States as a country that does not respect or abide 
by the rule of law by the populations and government officials of countries 
around the globe—including our closest democratic allies—the Committee 
concluded “[t]he fact that America is seen in a negative light by so many 
complicates our ability to attract allies to our side, strengthens the hand of 
our enemies, and reduces our ability to collect intelligence that can save 
lives.”39 Consequently, concern about reputation is a much more important 
factor in determining compliance with international law than Goldsmith and 
Posner have acknowledged—especially in a situation where the initial 
decision to depart from international obligations produced such immediate 
and significant reputational costs. 
So, in the end, my book aims to confront head–on the argument that 
Goldsmith and Posner make in their book; it’s sort of the yin to their yang. 
It documents many cases in which, at the State Department Legal Adviser’s 
counsel, the methods selected or the justifications employed were shaped to 
comply with international law.  Contrary to Goldsmith and Posner’s 
hypothesis, the Legal Advisers have managed to convince decision–makers 
that international law is real law, and that the advantages of complying with 
it almost always outweigh the short–term benefits of breaching it.  Thank 
you.  I’m now happy to answer your questions.  
 
Question:   
 
Did the Legal Advisers ever discuss whether they considered resigning 
when their advice was not followed? 
 
Professor Scharf:   
 
All of the Legal Advisers said that they considered resigning at some point 
during their tenure.  They also said that you cannot have a job in 
government as a lawyer, especially at the top of an agency like the Office of 
the Legal Adviser, unless you go in knowing that you might have to resign 
one day on principle.  They said that if you’re a lawyer and you aren’t 
willing to resign, you don’t have any cards to use against the policy–
makers.  And you will not have any moral authority—if you feel compelled 
to stay on—no matter what.   Directly on point is the story of Elizabeth 
Wilmshurst—the Acting Legal Adviser of the UK Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs—who resigned when her memo concluding that it would be 
unlawful to invade Iraq in 2003 was disregarded by the Prime Minister.  But 
Ms. Wilmshurst couldn’t go to the press and say “I’m resigning because 
they didn’t follow my advice and they’re breaking international law in a 
really big way.” Why? Because as a lawyer she was subject to the attorney–
client privilege of confidentiality.  So she quietly resigned, she joined 
  
 39. Id.  
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Chatham House as a professor, and nobody would have known about her 
memo if it were not for the fact that someone else in the government 
subsequently leaked it to the press.  So why didn’t the U.S. Legal Advisers 
resign?  I think part of the explanation is that they realized that, in each 
case, the resignation would not have made a huge difference, and that their 
legal advice was needed to try to clean up the mess.  But if things had gotten 
really bad, they all said that what Elizabeth Wilmshurst did was right. 
 
Question:   
 
I’d like to probe on the rule of law a little bit, and I wouldn’t have expected 
you to cover this in your speech, but there is usually conflict between the 
State Department and the Defense Department and Justice Department.  An 
example of the conflict over rule of law would be the case of Medellin v. 
Texas,40 where President Bush did follow the advice of the State 
Department—against the advice of the Justice Department—to honor 
international law in terms of our consular treaty.  But on the other hand, the 
way he chose to do it was a rather clear violation of our Constitution, and 
the Supreme Court so held.  So do you have any reaction to that kind of 
situation? 
 
Scharf:   
 
The Legal Advisor at the time, who was John Bellinger, used that example 
as one where the President acted against his personal and political interests 
to try to uphold international law.  Bellinger said that President Bush was 
from a state, Texas, where they are very much in favor of the death penalty.  
In fact when he ran for President, Bush bragged about how many times he 
had signed execution orders.  And Bush personally thought that this awful 
guy, Medellin, who had been responsible for a terrible rape and murder, 
should be executed.  On the other hand, the State Department Legal Adviser 
advised the President that the ICJ had ruled that the United States has to 
give Medellin a new sentencing hearing because he was not told upon his 
arrest that as a Mexican citizen he had the right to consult with a consular 
officer.  It potentially could have made a difference in his case because his 
strategy at trial was to say, “look, I did a terrible, heinous thing, I’m awful, I 
hate myself, you should hate me too, I should be killed.” In his culture that 
was how you show remorse and contrition, and how you seek forgiveness.  
But in Texas, if a murderer says to the jury, “I should be killed,” they’re 
going to oblige him.  His consular officer could have explained all of that to 
him, so this really could have made a difference to the outcome of the case.  
And so Bellinger urged the President to issue an Executive Order that would 
implement the ICJ decision, requiring Texas to hold a new sentencing 
  
 40. 552 U.S. 491 (2008). 
140 Michigan State Journal of International Law [Vol. 19:1 
 
hearing.  Ultimately the Supreme Court ruled that the President did not have 
the power to force the State of Texas to stay the execution because the 
Statute of the ICJ is a non–self–executing treaty and only the Congress can 
implement it through a federal statute.  So in retrospect, Bellinger should 
have advised the President to go to Congress and get a law that implements 
the ICJ Statute, or authorizes the President to do so.  And in fact, there is 
legislation pending right now that will do that, which hopefully Congress 
will approve soon.  From reading the Executive’s briefs, I don’t think this 
was just a clever strategy to mollify the international community without 
enforcing the ICJ’s decision.  But perhaps it does suggest that Bellinger was 
a better international lawyer than a Constitutional lawyer. 
 
Follow up Question:  
 
So we ended up violating international law while upholding the 
Constitution.  My question is, which law has priority? 
 
Scharf:  
 
Well, domestically, there have been a series of U.S. cases that uphold our 
Constitution over treaties and customary international law.  That doesn’t 
excuse us from violating international law, though.  There is a well–
accepted international law rule that a country can’t use its internal 
Constitutional decisions or statutes as an excuse for non–performance of 
international obligations.  So, the Legal Advisor serves as the government’s 
conscience on international law.  But it’s absolutely right that there should 
be other government officials that focus on Constitutional law.  And when 
there is a possible conflict, the important thing is for the Legal Adviser to 
advise the president that there will be international consequences.  
 
Question from Scott Horton:  
 
I’d like to ask you a little bit more about Jack Goldsmith and Eric Posner’s 
book, which I think you make amazing use of here.  There’s a statement in 
their book, a contention put forward aggressively, that individuals may 
never be the subject of international law, and may never be punished under 
international law, which would be rather shocking to people who are put on 
trial at places like Nuremburg—not to mention the international criminal 
tribunals that you’ve worked so long with.  And indeed, while you see at the 
beginning a passing reference to international humanitarian law to be 
developed in a later chapter, when you look through the book you discover 
it’s not there.  And it’s like they’ve wished this into oblivion, because it 
doesn’t seem to meet their prescriptions.  But on the other hand, is it fair to 
say here they’re not describing international law as it is, because they 
obliterated all that? Instead, are they trying to describe a new international 
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law that they want to create, in which there is no role for the Geneva 
Convention, the Convention against torture, and so forth? 
 
Scharf:  
 
I absolutely agree with your conclusion, Scott, and I want to share a quote 
with you that I think will explain what’s going on.  Before I do, however, 
I’d like to add something.  When I mentioned the practical reasons the 
Legal Advisers perceive a compliance pull of international law, the one I 
forgot to mention was that the Legal Advisors believed that sometimes there 
would be domestic, foreign, or international criminal legal responsibility for 
violating international criminal law, and it was quite real.  So, if we aren’t 
going to prosecute in the United States under our own statutes that 
implement the Torture Conventions and the Geneva Convention which 
require prosecution, then perpetrators could still face prosecution abroad.  
For example, the International Criminal Court has jurisdiction over any war 
crimes or crimes against humanity committed in Afghanistan, which is a 
State Party to the Rome Treaty, whether the perpetrators are Afghans or 
Americans.  Also, under the principle of universal jurisdiction, which 
applies to grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions and acts of torture, 
European and Latin American courts may issue an indictment and arrest 
warrant to individual Americans involved in war crimes and torture.  And 
even just an indictment by one of those countries can render a person a 
prisoner in his own country.  Reportedly, Henry Kissinger doesn’t travel to 
certain countries anymore, because after Chris Hitchens wrote the book, The 
Indictment of Henry Kissinger, several countries opened up criminal 
investigations into his involvement in acts of torture and assassinations in 
Latin America during the Nixon Administration.  And several countries 
have ongoing criminal investigations into Rumsfeld and Yoo.  There is also 
the possibility of civil suits under the Alien Tort Statute in U.S. courts. 
Now, here’s the quote I was looking for.  Nick Rostow, who served as 
the Chief Counsel at the National Security Council during the first Bush 
Administration and later as Chief Counsel to the U.S. Ambassador to the 
UN, wrote recently: 
Criticism of the United States on international law grounds is especially 
notable because of the very nature of the United States as a country.  The 
United States is defined by law.  Its oaths or citizenship and office holding 
are pledges to the Constitution, not to a flag, not to a territory, not to the 
motherland or fatherland, and of course, not to a sovereign.  The law 
defines who an American is, and it binds each of us to every other.  That is 
part of the reason why the United States cannot long sustain foreign 
policies at odds with international law.  In the end, Americans will not 
support them.  The American people will ask “Is it legal?” before they ask 
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any other question about foreign policy actions short of self–defense 
against direct aggression.41 
Rostow’s observation suggests that as long as policymakers, bureaucrats, 
and the general public believe that compliance with international law is 
important, this belief will have a significant impact on State decision–
making.  To prevent that, Posner and Goldsmith employ something akin to 
George Orwell’s concept of black/white.42  What they want to do is 
convince the American people that binding international law really means 
non–binding non–law.  And they have a whole book that tries to explain 
that international law is just like a non–binding letter of credit.  It’s just 
politics.  And if they say it over and over again, and if everybody reads it, if 
the elite start to read it, if the public starts to read it, if the academics start to 
buy into it, then maybe we’ll just hear international law and think 
international politics.  And that is absolutely key, because without doing 
that the American people won’t stand for their government being a lawless 
government.  
But what my book does is the exact opposite.  It says, guess what? All 
this stuff that’s in Goldsmith and Posner’s book is not based on reality.  If 
you look inside the black box, which for the first time ever we’re opening 
up, you see that government policymakers have—for at least the past thirty 
years covered by our data—considered international law to be real and 
important.  And their lawyers have thought that as well.  And so, 
international law is not fake law.  It’s real law, and that’s the moral of my 
story tonight, and of our book. 
 
Question:  
 
When Professor Yoo returned to Berkeley, he was subject to a lot of student 
protest, a lot of public protest, and I was wondering if you have followed 
any of the things that are going on with him now, as he tries to assimilate 
back into being just a professor, from the things he did. 
 
Scharf:  
 
Yes, there was an effort by his colleagues to try to have his tenure removed, 
but his Dean essentially said, “no, things that professors do when they work 
for governments or international organizations when they are on leave 
should not be held against them when they return.” You know, in academia 
there are basically only two things that will cause you to lose tenure.  One is 
  
 41. Nicholas Rostow, Law Abiding: Restoring America’s Global Reputation, THE 
AMERICAN INTEREST, Jan./Feb. 2008, at 81. 
 42. GEORGE ORWELL, NINETEEN EIGHTY–FOUR (1949). 
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to commit murder or rape.  The other is to commit plagiarism.  But 
apparently if you counsel people to torture, that’s not enough.  And that’s 
what his Dean basically said—at least to the extent that it was done during a 
leave. 
I also want to mention that the Department of Justice is currently 
undertaking an ethics probe into whether John Yoo violated ethical 
standards.  What I’ve been hearing is that the probe is likely to exonerate 
him, and that scares me.  I think this is part of the Obama Administration’s 
policy; they want to be like Nelson Mandela after apartheid.  They do not 
want to look back; they want to look only forward.  They realize that the 
whole issue of trying to prosecute or punish Bush Administration officials 
for torture would be extremely politically divisive.  It gives ammunition to 
the Republicans, and it will just mess up the message and derail health care, 
the stimulus package, and the other things on President Obama’s agenda.   
And so, I think we’re going to see John Yoo and the others getting a 
pass.  The reason that scares me can be summarized by the phrase, “those 
you cannot remember the past are condemned to repeat it.” There needs to 
be an authoritative statement by the government, saying the legal advice of 
the “War Council” was wrong; and it was wrong of the “War Council” 
lawyers to cut the President off from the lawyers with the most expertise in 
interpreting international law.  Without that type of message, we are likely 
to see something like this done again in the future.   
 
 
[Editor’s Note: A few months after Michael P. Scharf’s speech, the results 
of the U.S. Department of Justice’s ethics probe were published, finding 
that Yoo had in fact committed professional misconduct,43 but the Associate 
Deputy Attorney General overruled the recommendations of the probe.44]  
 
  
 43. Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report, supra note 3, at 252. 
 44. Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. Deputy Attorney Gen, to the 
Attorney Gen, on Decision Regarding Objections to the Findings of Prof’l Misconduct in the 
Office of Prof’l Responsibility Report 2 (Jan. 5, 2010), available at 
http://judiciary.house.gov.hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf. 

